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ubert Dreyfus has recently made a distinction be
tween two types of resoluteness, and hence two
types of authenticity, found in Martin Heidegger's
1
Being and Time. The first he associates with the so
cial virtuoso, Aristotle's Phronemos, while the second he associ
ates with the cultural master, the world-creating individual. The
distinction between these two types of authentic being-in-the
world may, in fact, serve to explain in part the radical divergence
that has taken place between Heidegger's self-proclaimed follow
ers in the Continental tradition. While thinkers such as Jacques
Derrida and Richard Rorty have inherited the ideal of the strong
poet, the world-defining individual, others have embraced the
more Aristotelian account, concentrating on our practical situat
edness in the world. 2
The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer has all too often been
associated with that of the former, subjecting him to the associ
ated charges of subjectivism and relativism. However, it is here
that Dreyfus' distinction becomes important, for Gadamer's
thougl1t is much more closely related to the Aristotelian side of
Heidegger than it is to the pernicious, Nietzschean side. More
specifically, Dreyfus' formulation of the Aristotelian form of
authenticity found in Heidegger can help us to understand how
Gadamer's notion of openness, a frequently misunderstood con
cept, functions within his philosophical hermeneutics. The pur
pose of this paper will thus be to explore the authenticity of
openness, the sense in which Gadamer's conception of openness
entails a notion of authenticity that is directly connected to
practical, ethical concerns. In the end, this project will require
that we relate openness to ethics, in a Socratic sense, as a shared
striving towards the good. Gadamer states in the "Preface to the
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First Edition" of his first major work, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, "I
do not assert that Plato's 'ethics' is dialectical; rather, I ask
whether and in what way Plato's dialectic is 'ethics'" (xxv). In a
similar vein, I will here make a gesture towards explaining how
Gadamer's advocation of openness, as a call to authenticity, may
in fact constitute an ethics.
Gadamer1s project in Truth and Method is from the start an
obviously epistemological one, concerned with outlining the con
ditions of possibility for all understanding. Integral to this en
deavor is his analysis of the forestructure of understanding.
Following Heidegger, Gadamer holds that all understanding is
predicated upon a pre given set of meanings and purposes that
we bring along with us into every attempt to understand. We
continually bring pre given prejudices to bear on the situations in
which we find ourselves, these prejudices helping to determine
all understanding. In fact, these prejudices are wholly necessary
in that they enable any understanding at all. In understanding an
historical text, we each bring our own personal horizon consist
ing of our meanings and purposes into contact with the historical
horizon of the text in an endeavor to fuse those horizons in the
event of understanding. Understanding, as an event, has the
structure of a dialogue between our hermeneutical situation and
the text or tradition that we seek to understand. Gadamer thus
rescues prejudice from the Enlightenmenfs "prejudice against
prejudice" in order to highlight the fact that those prejudices the
Enlightenment viewed as distorting and negative are in fact
required for any real dialogue to take place. For Gadamer, we are
continually caught up in the dynamics of the hermeneutic circle
such that all understanding involves a fusion of the part that is
the text with the whole of our background in a tradition of
meanings and purposes.
In this sense, the dialogical structure of understanding
dictates that understanding reaches its fullest potential only
when it is also a self-understanding. All understanding requires
an application to our specific historical situation. In fact, applica
tion is necessary for any fusion of horizons, for any real dialogue,
3
to take place. Application thus becomes the key to saving the
truth of the humanities from the shackles of scientific methodol
ogy. It is the application of whatever it is we wish to understand,
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the universal, to our present situation, the particular, that works
to comprise the dialogic structure of understanding. Application
thus involves a mediation of the universal and the particular that
in fact determines both, a basic statement of the hermeneutic
circle. "[I]t explicitly and consciously bridges the temporal dis
tance that separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes
the alienation of meaning that the text has undergone" (Truth and
Method, TM, 311). It is through the dialogical encounter of the
interpreter and the text that both come into their true being as
they are synthesized amidst the understanding of the subject
matter that rises up between them.
A hermeneutics based on the notion of application is, in
this sense, intimately connected to many of the concerns of
Aristotelian ethics. Gadamer claims that the dynamics of applica
tion, and indeed of hermeneutics in general, are modeled in
Aristotle1s conception of phronesis. Phronesis is Aristotle1s formula
tion of moral knowledge, knowledge based on the correct appli
cation of reason to moral action. In fact, Aristotle1s conception of
moral knowledge is very different from any form of knowledge
derived from methodological concerns due to the fact that"in the
moral (applied) sphere, method is in fact determined by the
object itself.4 The peculiar fact of moral knowledge is that it is
only as it is applied; it is necessarily connected to the particular
situation in which it is applied and, inasmuch as the situation is
in part determined by the nature of the one who is in it, to the
s
very being of the moral agent.
The remaining possibility, then, is that intelligence
is a state grasping the truth, involving reason,
concerned with action about what is good or bad
for a human being. (Nicomachean Ethics, 6.43)
It is important to note that Gadamer considers a hermeneutics

governed by the notion of application to function in the same
way. All understanding necessarily involves an application to the
particular situation in which the interpreter is called to partici
pate. The knowledge arising out of understanding is thus for
mally akin to moral knowledge. Its purpose is to say something
about the engaged situation in which we find ourselves, not to
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contemplate in a state of detached neutrality a purely objective
6
reality. Understanding is in fact something that occurs to us.
Gadamer goes on to elucidate the occurrence of under
standing by claiming that it has the structure of an expe~ence
(Elj".11mmg) and is thus an epistemologically basic concept.' The
activity of understanding consists of the dialogue in which we
take part. This dialogue, motivated by the aspect of application,
seeks to reconcile the foreignness of the historical horizon of the
text with the situation of the interpreter. Understanding of the
subject matter grmvs up in between this dialogue and has the
structure of an experience (Erfahnmg). It is something that speaks
to us, affects us, and moves us in certain directions. Gadamer
thus claims that experience is essentially negative, futural, and
constitutive of openness. It is negative in that it tells us something
that is other from us or in some sense objective. It is futural in that
it projects a sense of expectations of what will occur in the future.
And it is constitutive of openness in that it reveals something to
us about our situation that opens us to reality, namely our radical
finitude.
These three moments of experience are in fact a reflection
of the to and fro motion of Gadamer's conception of dialogue,
and hence of the very structure of understanding itself. The
negativity of experience is a reflection of the recognition of the
Other, of the historical horizon of the text that speaks to us from
outside of our own situation. Still, this Other is essentially tied to
s
us as a Thou. The negativity of experience is thus productive in
that it not only says something, but it says something to us that
has a meaning for us. What it says, as something that is essen
tially applied, pushes us into future possibilities. Being pushed as
such, we are forced to realize our own inherent limitations. We
are creatures always striving to understand but never able to
fully bridge the gap between our knowledge and the call of the
real.
The truth of experience always implies an orienta
tion toward new experience. That is why a person
who is called experienced has become so not only
through experiences but is also open to new experi
ences ... the experienced person proves to be ...
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-----------------------------------------------------someone who is radically undogmatic; who, be
cause of the many experiences he has had and the
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particu
larly well equipped to have new experiences and
to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has
its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge
but in the openness to experience that is made
possible by experience itself. (TM, 355, italics his)
The realization of our essential finitude thus cultivates a sense of
openness in that it forces us to pay ever-increasing attention to
the real, that which is disclosed through genuine thinking. This is
actually the true purpose of the dialectic of experience as
Gadamer conceives it, for openness is itself a condition of under
standing. Only if we are prepared to accept something that is
against us can understanding, as a fusion of horizons, occur at all.
The experienced person is open to further experiences and thus
open to understanding itself. The virtue of the experienced per
son is thus not that she knows, but that she is open to knowing,
that she has the peculiar ability to reach an understanding over
and over again in a variety ~f different circumstances.
It will be helpful here to relate Gadamer's conception of
openness to Heidegger's discussion of authenticity. Though it
may not be obvious at first glance, it is my contention that there
is a real sense in which Gadamer's advocation of openness is a
9
call for us to become authentic, to real-ize our Situation. This
becomes especially apparent when one takes into account the
distinction Dreyfus has made between the Aristotelian and
Kierkegaardian forms of authenticity present in Being and Time.
For the Aristotelian Heidegger, the resolute real-ization of our
unique Situation that constitutes authenticity is not a conscious
recognition of the structure of our being-in-the-world. Rather, it
involves a radical opening of ourselves to being moved into
action by the Situation. As Dreyfus quotes from a 1953 lecture of
Heidegger's:
The essence of resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit) lies
in the opening (Ent-borgenheit) of human Dasein
into the clearing of being, and not at all in a storing
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up of energy for "action" ... Its relation to being is
one of letting-be. (Dreyfus, 1991,318)
The resoluteness of authenticity is in no wayan intentionalistic
phenomenon oriented toward any specific form of action. Rather,
the facing up to guilt that is the hallmark of authenticity here
lO
involves a giving ourselves over. Authenticity involves a recog
nition of our being thrown into a world of meanings and pur
poses that are not strictly our own. This, in turn, opens us to that
world, giving us the ability to truly take it up. Our openness to
this world is thus truly consecrated in terms of active participa
tion rather than detached knowledge.
The phenomenon set forth with the term resolute
ness can hardly be confused with an empty
"habitus" and an indefinite "velleity." Resolute
ness does not first represent and acknowledge a
situation to itself, but has already placed itself in it.
Resolute, Da-sein is already acting . .. But resolute

ness is only the authenticity of care itself, cared for in
care and possible as care. (Being and Time, BT, 300,
italics his)
The openness to the Situation that authenticity demands is nei
ther a purely practical nor a purely theoretical affair. Rather, it is
connected to the very being of Dasein itself as a recognition of its
basis in care,l1 a recognition that one does not 'have' but actually
'does' by acting, by resolutely taking up the projects our culture
and tradition hand over to us. The projects we take up authenti
cally are in fact indistinguishable from those we take up inau
thentically. It is rather the self-consciousness with which we take
up those projects that distinguishes authenticity.
For Heidegger, the transformation to authenticity
signals a transformation in the form of my every
day activity, leaving the content unchanged. I en
act my authenticity in all my absorbed involved
activity ... The transformation to owning up to
Dasein's nullity is, of course, the same transforma
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tion we have already described as becoming open
to the Situation. (Dreyfus, 1991, 322)
Thus, in responding to the concrete Situation the
resolute individual is recognized as a model; not
of what general thing to do, but of how to respond
in an especially appropriate way. (Dreyfus, 1999,
12)
What is definitive of resoluteness is not the content of activity or
even a general method of acting. Rather, resoluteness involves the
ability to respond to the situation appropriately, correctly, what
ever that may be. Heidegger's Aristotelian formulation of authen
ticity thus amounts to a giving oneself over to openness in such a
way as to engage oneself in thinking. Of course, this is not the
end of the story for Heidegger. He goes on from here to discuss
the authenticity involved in anticipatory resoluteness towards
death, a much more Christian resoluteness that requires a pri
mordial understanding of Dasein itself. This understanding of
Dasein then makes possible a distinct transformation of self and
world that is exemplified in the cultural master, someone who is
able to take up marginal practices present in one's cultural past in
such a way as to disclose a truly new world. However, as Dreyfus
notes, Heidegger is never able to fully synthesize these two
notions of authenticity, leaving his account of resoluteness some'
12
W h at amb rguous.
I believe, despite the fact that Gadamer never refers to
authenticity as such in his writings, pOSSibly in order to avoid the
implications of Heidegger's Kierkegaardian account, that we can
gain a better understanding of his conception of openness by
relating it to Heidegger's Aristotelian account of authenticity as I
have outlined it here. The hermeneutic call to openness should be
read as a natural outgrowth of the nature of understanding.
Guided by the principle of application, all understanding is
something that occurs to us and has the structure of an experi
ence. Understanding is dialogical. Its essential negativity, its
experience of the Other, continually reveals to itself its own
finitude, thus opening it to further experience, experience of the
real.
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Thus experience is experience of human finitude.
The truly experienced person is one who has taken
this to heart, who knows that he is master neither
of time nor the future. The experienced man
knows that all foresight is limited and all plans
uncertain. In him is realized the true value of
experience ... Experience teaches us to acknowl
edge the reaL The genuine result of experience,
then-as of all desire to know-is to know what is.
(TM,357)
Just as Heidegger1s social virtuoso has faced guilt in such a way
as to resolutely take up the projects of tradition, the truly experi
enced person, for Gadamer, has accepted the radical finitude of
the human situation in such a way as to become open to the truth
of the real as it is revealed in genuine understanding. What
distinguishes the person who is guided by openness is thus not
what one does generally, but rather the appropriateness of one1s
response to each particular situation. As a condition of under
standing, openness is exemplified in each particular event of
understanding. The open person is thus the one who understands
most readily, just as Heidegger1s social virtuoso is the one who is
13
simply able to respond appropriately to the Situation. Impor
tantly, Gadamer1s account of openness cannot be something that
guides us in our endeavor to understand generally. Openness is
simply a condition of every particular understanding qua under
standing and can1t be abstracted to the point of a guiding princi
ple or method.
Admittedly, Gadamer1s seeming advocation of openness
often appears to have a pseudo-methodological intent. It is for
this reason that many of his critics have labeled him a conserva
tive, claiming his call to openness with regard to the way in
which we approach language and tradition bars us from being
able to adequately criticize those institutions. Yet, our discussion
of openness here has led us to the conclusion that it is simply a
condition of authentic understanding. Like Heideggerls Aris
totelian conception of authenticity, it is not a general ideal with
which we can approach texts, traditions, other people, etc., but
rather an instance of every appropriate understanding. This in
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terpretation also has the advantage of taking seriously Gadamer1s
fervent insistence that he is merely describing what takes place in
every genuine understanding. As he boldly states in the
"Forward to the Second Edition" of Truth and Method, //My real
concern was and is philosophic: not with what we do or what we
ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting
and doing" (xxvii). How then do we account for Gadamer's
seeming advocation of openness?
It is my contention that Gadamer's call to openness, as a
condition of every genuine understanding, is in fact an ethics. In
his first major work, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, Gadamer claims that
Platonic dialectic, as a shared striving towards the good, in fact
coincides with Socratic ethics. He thus focuses on the form of the
Platonic dialogues, noting that the inquiry into any particular
subject matter that takes place there also functions in such a way
as to bring the inquirers into their ownmost being-in-themselves
and being-together. This he connects to the "positive" function of
Socratic refutation, the bringing about of a shared search for an
agreement with oneself and with others that is both a means to
and the leading instance of the good. What we learn through
dialectic, and thus through understanding in its most basic sense,
is not merely the subject matter involved, but the basic being
with that constitutes Dasein1s existential structure.
This general sense of dialectic as man's giving an
accounting regarding the existential possibilities
to which he lays claim and regarding his claim to
knowledge of entities in general makes dialectic
important, at the same time, in a way that reaches
beyond each particular object of investigation and
accounting: it makes us, in general, JJ more dialecti
cal," by grasping the possibility (which is inherent
in human existence) of understanding ourselves
and of justifying the claim to knowledge wherever
it is made. (PDE, 100)
We noted earlier that the true purpose of the dialectic of experi
ence is the recognition of our own human finitude. The distin
guishing feature of the experienced person is the willingness to
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accept something that is against oneself in such a way as to be
able to understand. Though this cannot amollnt to a method of
understanding due to the fact that openness is simply a condition
...f cyery genuine understanding, it can ~ viewed as an ethics, as
a way of relating t~, others and to the world. in short, as a , ..' ay of
making liS ,. more dialecticaL"
This ethics admittedlv functions somewhat behind the
sct:'nes in T rut/; llnd .\letiwd. StilL it constitutes a major concern in
both Gadamer'$ earlier and later writings. Indeed, as Bernstein
has noted, there is a latent radical strain present in Gadamer's
,",;ark that pulls us toward the notions of freedom and solidarity.14
In fact, Gadamer considers his philosophical hermeneutics to
function as a corrective to the expansion and domination of
technology and planning reason.
The hermeneutic consciousness, which must be
awakened and kept awake, recognizes that in the
age of science philosophy's claim of superiority
has something chimerical and unreal about it. But
though the
of man is more than ever intensify
ing its criticism of what has gone before to the
point of becoming a utopian or eschatological con
sciousness, the hermeneutic consciousness seeks
to confront that will v,.'ith something of the truth of
remembrance: with what is still and ever again
real. (TM, xxxvii)

''''ill

The basis of this corrective is in fact the ethics associated here
with openness. If we heed the call to openness, we will then be
in a position to recognize our finitude, and hence those things
that are against us, not in such a way as to methodically facilitate
understanding in general, but rather in order to come into our
true being-with-others. Dialectic, here, is truly an ethics in that
only through dialogical understanding, and the openness this
presupposes, do we arrive at a genuine relationship with the
world, with others, and with ourselves.
Notes
I

"Could anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?:

-
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Reinterpreting Division I of Being and Time in the light of Division II."
(Paper presented at the Inaugural Meeting of the International Society
for Phenomenological Studies, Asilomar, California, July 19-23, 1999).
2 See also Charles Taylor's distinction between authenticity (A) and
authenticity (B) in his The Ethics ofAuthenticity (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991, 66).
3 "In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs
which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultane
ously superseded. To bring about this fusion in a regulated way is the
task of what we called historically effected consciousness. Although
this task was obscured by aesthetic-historical positivism following on
the heels of romantic hermeneutics, it is, in fact, the central problem of
hermeneutics. It is the problem of application, which is to be found in
all understanding" (TM, 307).
4 "As we see, the problem of method is entirely determined by the ob
ject-a general Aristotelian principle-and the important thing for us is
to examine more closely the relation between moral being and moral
consciousness that Aristotle sets out in his Ethics" (TM, 313).
5 "For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objec
tive knowledge-i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situa
tion that he merely observes; he is directly confronted with what he
sees. [t is something that he has to do" (TM, 314).
6 "For the hermeneutical problem too is clearly distinct from 'pure!
knowledge detached from any particular kind ofbeing" (TM, 314, ital
ics his).
7 "This is precisely what we have to keep in mind in analyzing histori
cally effected consciousness: it has the structure of an experience
~Erfahrung)" (TM, 346).
"Thus the negativity of experience has a curiously productive mean
, ing. It is not simply that we see through a deception and hence make a
correction, but we acquire a comprehensive knowledge. We cannot,
therefore, have a new experience of any object at random, but it must
be of such a nature that we gain better knowledge through it, not only
of itself, but of what we thought we knew before-i.e., of a universal.
The negation by means of which it achieves this is a determinate nega
tion. We call this kind of experience dialectical" (TM, 353).
lj For Heidegger, Situation, as opposed to everyday situation, refers to
our authentic 'place' within the temporal structure of being-in-the
world. It is important to note that having such a Situation is predicated
on resoluteness. Situation is not something we all have and must simply
recognize. Actually, the existential attributes of a resolute Da-sein cre
ate Situation in the first place (BT,299-300).
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"Ent-schlossellheit, then, is the openness that results from acceptance
of the breakdown of the ethical illusion oflucid total choice, and the
realization that the self is impotent and empty. It is therefore mislead
ing to call the change choosing to choose. Dasein does not choose at
all. Rather, Dasein as a disclosing way of being accepts the call to ac
knowledge its essential empty openness" (Dreyfus, 1991,318).
II The concept of care, for Heidegger, encompasses the existential
whole of Da-sein 's ontological structure (BT, 193).
12 "It is hard to reconcile this claim that only anticipatory resoluteness
reveals Dasein authentically and fully with the claim in the earlier dis
cussion of the resoluteness of facing guilt that 'we have now arrived at
that truth ofDasein which is most primordial because it is authentic.'
(343) I think Heidegger was simply confused as to how he wanted to
relate the two kinds ofresoluteness" (Dreyfus, 1999,26).
13 "The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like
something occurrent which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It only
gets disclosed in free resolving which has not been determined before
hand but is open to the possibility of such determination" (BT, 355).
14 See Bernstein, Richard. "What is the Difference that Makes a Differ
ence? Gadamer, Habennas, and Rorty." In Hermeneutics and Modern
Philosophy. Brice R. Wachterhauser, ed. (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1986,343-376.)
10
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